Abstract-Given the event-driven and framework-based architecture of Android apps, finding the ordering of callbacks executed by the framework remains a problem that affects every tool that requires inter-callback reasoning. Previous work has focused on the ordering of callbacks related to the Android components and GUI events. But the execution of callbacks can also come from direct calls of the framework (API calls). This paper defines a novel program representation, called Callback Control Flow Automata (CCFA), that specifies the control flow of callbacks invoked via a variety of sources. We present an analysis to automatically construct CCFAs by combining two callback control flow representations developed from the previous research, namely, Window Transition Graphs (WTGs) and Predicate Callback Summaries (PCSs). To demonstrate the usefulness of our representation, we integrated CCFAs into two client analyses: a taint analysis using FLOWDROID, and a value-flow analysis that computes source and sink pairs of a program. Our evaluation shows that we can compute CCFAs efficiently and that CCFAs improved the callback coverages over WTGs. As a result of using CCFAs, we obtained 33 more true positive security leaks than FLOWDROID over a total of 55 apps we have run. With a low false positive rate, we found that 22.76% of source-sink pairs we computed are located in different callbacks and that 31 out of 55 apps contain source-sink pairs spreading across components. Thus, callback control flow graphs and inter-callback analysis are indeed important. Although this paper mainly uses Android, we believe that CCFAs can be useful for modeling control flow of callbacks for other event-driven, framework-based systems.
INTRODUCTION
With more than 1.4 billion Android devices sold [1] and over 2.5 million apps in the official Android app's market [2] , Android has become one of the leading platforms for smartphone devices. However, the complex event-driven, framework-based architecture that developers use to implement apps imposes new challenges on the quality of Android apps, creating new kinds of code smells and bugs [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . Due to the impact of the Android apps on the market and the complexity of developing apps, there is a need for programming tools for analyzing Android apps. One of the foundational challenges for developing these tools is the sequencing or ordering of callback methods. Even for a small subset of callbacks, it has been shown that the current state-of-the-art tools fail to generate sequences of callbacks that match the runtime behavior of Android apps [7] .
Previous tools have used manual models to obtain sequences of callbacks. For instance, Pathak et al. [8] and Arzt et al. [9] used the lifecycle of components to represent control flow between callbacks. This approach can miss sequences of callbacks invoked in API methods such as AsyncTask.execute and LoaderManager.initLoader. Other approaches modeled a subset of callbacks, specifically the callbacks invoked from external events including GUI [10] , [11] , [12] and sensors' events [13] . Another approach automatically summarize the Android framework to identify the control flow of callbacks implemented in the Android API methods [14] . Nevertheless, there is not a representation that integrates different sources of changes of control, such as external events and API methods, and be directly usable by analysis and testing tools.
In this paper, we propose a novel program representation, namely Callback Control Flow Automata (CCFA), to specify control flow of callbacks for event-driven and framework-based applications. The design of CCFA is based on the Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) [15] , which extends the Finite State Machine (FSM) by labeling transitions using information such as guards. Using the CCFAs, we aim to specify four types of callback control flow existing in an app: 1) a callback B is invoked synchronously after another callback A, 2) B is invoked asynchronously after A, meaning B is put in the event queue and invoked eventually after A is invoked, 3) during an execution of A, B is invoked synchronously by an API call, and 4) during an execution of A, B is invoked asynchronously by an API call.
In the CCFAs, a state indicates whether the execution path enters or exits a callback. The transition from one state to another represents the transfer of control flow between callbacks. The transitions are labeled with guards, the conditions under which a transition is enabled. Such a condition can be an external event (e.g. click the button) or an API call. The input alphabet of the CCFA is composed by the names of callbacks implemented in the app. Specifically, we use callbackname entry and callbackname exit as input symbols so we can specify the case where one callback is invoked during the execution of the other (see Type 3 and Type 4 of control flow discussed above). Using this approach, the language recognized by a CCFA is a set of paths of callbacks, or possible sequences of callbacks that can be invoked at runtime for an app.
To compute CCFAs, we designed a static analysis algorithm that traverses Windows Transition Graph (WTG) [10] to obtain the control flow of callbacks related to the windows (activities, dialogs and menus) and GUI events, and also, integrates Predicate Callback Summaries (PCSs) [14] for callback sequences invoked in the Android API methods. These API methods include the callbacks of the Android components' lifecycles, which are modeled manually in the previous work. Our approach is able to automatically handle them. In addition, we successfully added the callbacks for 9 additional external events: GPS location updates, enabling and disabling of GPS services, sensor events, two camera external events (when the camera shutters and when the camera takes a picture), network notifications (through the ConnectivityManager), a web client and a web chrome client that receive notifications from a WebView. The models for these events are constructed manually, but we show that CCFA can be easily extended to specify external events beyond the window and GUI events.
In this paper, we show two different approaches of integrating CCFAs into static analyses. In the first approach, we extend an existing inter-procedural, context-sensitive analysis to inter-callback dataflow analysis using CCFAs, and also instantiate it to compute inter-callback source and sink pairs of a program. In the second approach, we generate a program using the callback invocation paths provided by CCFAs to directly integrate CCFAs with FLOWDROID [9] .
We implemented the construction and applications of CCFAs using Soot and Spark. The WTGs were computed using GATOR [16] and the summaries for Android API methods were provided by Lithium [14] .
Our results show that the construction of CCFAs is very efficient, reporting 29 seconds per app on average. Compared to WTGs, CCFAs improved callback coverage 10.72% on average. In the best cases, we improved the app heregps's coverage from 50% to 100%, and for the app MyTracks, 78 more callbacks were integrated, improving the callback coverage 15.30%. Applying CCFAs, our tool found 33 more information leaks than FLOWDROID for 55 apps we ran. We also experimented on 60 apps from DroidBench that contain inter-callback security leaks, and our tool reports 96.00% precision and 84.21% recall. Importantly, we found that on average 22.76% of the source and sink pairs have the sources and sinks located in different callbacks. These results validated the hypothesis that the inter-callback analysis and callback control flow graphs are important for analyzing the global behaviors of the apps.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We define the Callback Control Flow Automata CCFA, a representation to specify callback control flow for event-driven, framework-dependent applications such as Android apps,
•
We design the algorithm to automatically compute CCFAs using apps and framework source code,
We design inter-callback dataflow analysis to report information leak and source-sink pairs using CCFAs, and
We implemented the tools for constructing and using the CCFAs and experimentally demonstrated that our algorithms are fast and are able to discover intercallback properties that previous tools cannot find.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of our work. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the definition of CCFAs and the algorithms for computing CCFAs. In Section 5 we show how to use CCFAs for inter-callback analysis. The evaluation of our work is presented in Section 6, followed by a discussion in Section 7 and the related work in Section 8. Finally, we present the conclusions and future work in Section 9.
AN OVERVIEW
Given the event-driven, framework-based architecture of Android apps, most of an app's implementation is done by defining callbacks that are invoked by the Android framework. To perform inter-callback static analysis or testing the apps beyond unit level, it is important to discover and represent the potential orders of the callbacks. In this section, we use an example to provide an overview of what is a CCFA and also the approach of computing the CCFA.
What is a CCFA
In Figure 1a , we show a simple Android app that contains one activity class called A. This activity implements the callbacks onCreate (line 3), onStart (line 7) and onStop (line 15). In the callback onCreate at line 5, the app sets an object of type CList as the event listener for the click event of the button b1. It also invokes the API method lm.initLoader at line 12 to load data, where this API call uses the class L (lines [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] to create a loader. Figure 1b shows the CCFA we constructed for Figure 1a . The representation is designed based on the Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM), and each transition is labeled with a pair (x, g) where x is an input symbol and g is a guard. The input symbol x can represent a callback's entry point (see A.onCreate entry on the transition from state q 1 to q 2 ), a callback's exit point (see A.onCreate exit on the transition from state q 2 to q 3 ), or an empty input represented by (see the transition from state q 4 to state q 6 ). Similar to the transitions in an EFSM, the inputs of CCFAs can be parametrized using variables. As examples, in Figure 1b , on the transition from state q 6 to state q 7 , the input L.onCreateLoader entry has a parameter cs, and it is used in the guard, the boolean expression cs = lm.initLoader (0 , null , 1 ), to specify that when the call site lm.initLoader at line 12 is encountered, the control flow transfers to the entry of the callback L.onCreateLoader. In case any other call site is encountered, the transition cannot be enabled. Similarly, the transition from state q 5 to state q 10 indicates that the parameter of input CList.onClick entry is evt, and when the event of click b1 is triggered, the callback CList.onClick will be invoked. For the transitions where the control flow transfer always happens, we use the trivial true guard.
This representation specifies both synchronous and asynchronous invocations of callbacks and we are able to recognize them based on the transitions' parameters and guards. Sequential invocation of callbacks is specified using the guard true or the guard related to the cs parameter. As an example, the transition from state q 3 to state q 4 in Figure 1b indicates Figure 1b) . Callbacks that are parametrized with external events are executed asynchronously. For instance, for the app in Figure 1a , when a user clicks button b1, the framework puts a task into an event queue, which eventually executes the callback CList.onClick. In Figure 1b , the transition between q 5 and q 10 specifies this control flow transfer.
How to Compute a CCFA
In Figure 2 , we show that our approach to computing CCFAs takes a Windows Transition Graph (WTG) [10] , the interprocedural control flow graphs (ICFGs) of callbacks in the app, and the Predicate Callback Summaries (PCSs) of the Android framework [14] as inputs. The WTG contains pre-computed callback control flow related to windows (Activities, Menus or Dialogs) and GUI events, and the PCS specifies the pre-computed callback control flow for the Android framework methods.
Performing on the three inputs, our approach consists of three major analyses: WTG Analysis, Callback Analysis, and PCS Analysis. As shown in Figure 2 , in the first step, the WTG Analysis traverses the WTG to obtain callback sequences located on the edges of WTG. For each callback, the WTG Analysis invokes the Callback Analysis, an interprocedural analysis on the ICFG of the callback, aiming to compute a CCFA that specifies the callback control flow implemented in the callback. The key role of a Callback Analysis is to integrate the callback control flow related to the API methods invoked in the callback. For each API call, the Callback Analysis finds the corresponding PCS and calls the PCS Analysis. The PCS Analysis traverses the PCS and generates a CCFA that represents all the sequences of callbacks executed in the API method. The output of the PCS Analysis is a CCFA for the given API call, which is used by the Callback Analysis. Each Callback Analysis generates a CCFA that represents all the sequences of callbacks generated from API calls done from the callback's ICFG. This CCFA is then composed in the WTG analysis. Once the WTG Analysis traverses all the edges in WTG, it returns the final CCFA for the app.
Using this approach, we correctly integrated the callback control flow from the three sources. In Figure 1b , the transitions between states q 1 , q 2 , q 3 and q 4 represent the sequential execution of the callbacks A.onCreate and A.onStart obtained from the WTG in Figure 1c . The Callback Analysis is flow and context-sensitive analysis and able to order the API methods invoked on the paths and also to distinguish the paths that invoke the API method and the paths that do not. At line 7 in Figure 1a , the callback A.onStart has two paths and only one of the paths invokes the API call lm.initLoader . Correspondingly, in Figure 1b , the transition from state q 4 to state q 5 represents the path that does not invoke the API call, while the transitions q 4 → q 6 → q 7 → q 8 → q 5 include the callback L.onCreateLoader invoked in the API method. In addition, Figure 1b indicates that the API call is invoked during the execution of A.onStart, as the transitions related to the API methods are located after A.onStart entry and before A.onStart exit . We also correctly retrieve the execution order of callbacks invoked within the Android API method from the PCS. The transitions between states q 6 , q 7 and q 8 in Figure 1b are generated by the PCS Analysis using the PCS shown in Figure 1d .
CALLBACK CONTROL FLOW AUTOMATA
In this section, we define our representation, Callback Control Flow Automata (CCFA) and clarify its capabilities of modeling actual runtime behaviors of Android apps.
Definition
The CCFA is a representation based on the computation model of Extended Finite State Machines (EFSMs) [8] . Definition 1 (CCFA). A CCFA over a finite set of input symbols X and input parameters R is a 4-tuple (S, s 0 , T, F ), where -S is a finite set of states, -s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, -T is the set of transitions, and each transition t ∈ T is a tuple (s 1 , x, g, s 2 ), where s 1 ∈ S and s 2 ∈ S are the two states, x ∈ X is the input symbol, and g is the guard, a predicate over the input parameters, and -F ⊆ S are a set of final states.
Input Symbols. The CCFA specifies the control flow transfer between callbacks. The input symbols are the names of the callbacks. Given a finite set of callback names of an app, C, we use the strings {x entry | x ∈ C} to denote the entry points of the callbacks (the entry node of the ICFG of the callback), and {x exit | x ∈ C} for the exit points (the exit node of the ICFG). The input symbols are defined as: X = {x entry ∪ x exit | x ∈ C}. As an example, if an app has one activity component, called A, that defines the two callbacks onCreate and onStart, we have the input symbol X = {A.onCreate entry , A.onCreate exit , A.onStart entry , A.onStart exit }. We use the entry and exit points of callbacks to be able to handle the following control flow relations: 1) one callback is invoked after the other callback, and 2) one callback is invoked during the execution of another callback. Input Parameters and Guards. Similar to EFSMs, input symbols of CCFAs can be parametrized. The input parameters are used by guards to specify the conditions of a transition. That is, the guards are predicates over input parameters that decide whether a transition can be fired. Each input on the transition can take input parameters of the following three types: evt, the external events, cs, the API call sites, and msg, the asynchronous messages. evt: In event-driven applications, an event listener is a callback that is executed to respond to an external event from the environment. In CCFAs, transitions to entry points of event listeners/callbacks are parametrized by the variable evt. This variable carries information about the specific event that triggers the invocation of the callback. For example, the transition from states q 5 to q 10 in Figure 1b is labeled with the input Clist.onClick entry , the input parameter for 1 class A extends Activity { this input is evt, and the guard that uses the input parameter is evt = click b1 , indicating that the event click b1 triggers the transition. When computing CCFAs, we obtain the list of events and their orders from the WTG. Among all the external events, a WTG focuses on modeling GUI events and the events that affect the state of windows. Specifically, a GUI event is a specific interaction of a user with a widget or view defined in an app (e.g. user clicks on a button). External events that affect the state of windows include hardware buttons back button or power button, and the actions such as rotation of the phone.
cs: The second factor that impacts the control flow of the callbacks is the Android API calls. To label the transition in the CCFA, we use the input parameter cs with the input symbol x entry (cs) and the guard cs = y.api to specify that at the API call site y.api , the control flow is transferred to the entry of the callback x , for x is the first callback to be executed in the api method. As a concrete example, in Figure 1b , the transition from states q 6 to q 7 is labeled with the input symbol L.onCreateLoader entry and its parameter cs, and the guard cs = lm.initLoader (0 , null , 1 ). The transition indicates that L.onCreateLoader is the first callback executed in the API call initLoader.
msg: There are two special Android API methods, Handler.sendMessage and Handler.post, that provide an asynchronous message-passing mechanism for an app. When the two APIs are invoked in the app, an instance of Handler will post messages and runnable objects respectively to the event queue. Correspondingly, when the message is dequeued, the framework execute callbacks Handler.handleMessage and Runnable.run respectively. In CCFAs, the transitions to the entry points of callbacks Handler.handleMessage (or the callback Runnable.run) are parametrized using the input parameter msg. The variable msg carries information about the specific Handler.sendMessage (or Handler.post) call site that triggers the asynchronous execution of the callback. As an example, Figure 3a shows an app that defines its own handler (MyH in lines 9-12) and this handler is used by activity A in the callback onPause.
The API call to Handler.sendMessage at line 6 is represented by the transition from state q 8 to state q 9 in Figure 3b . The transition is labeled with the callback name MyH .handleMessage entry , the input parameter msg, and the guard msg = h.sendMessage(m).
The Scope of CCFAs
To the best of our knowledge, the Android framework supports four types of control flow between callbacks: 1) a callback B is invoked synchronously after another callback A, 2) B is invoked asynchronously after A, meaning B is put in the event queue of the Android system and invoked eventually after A is invoked, 3) during an execution of A, B is invoked synchronously by an API call, and 4) during an execution of A, B is invoked asynchronously by an API call. Our CCFA is able to specify all the four cases. For the asynchronous invocation, we support the guards that use evt and msg as input parameters. Although the actual generation of CCFAs used WTGs as inputs in this paper, we believe that our representation is sufficient to specify the guards with events beyond GUI and Windows, e.g., sensor's events. Meanwhile, for other special Android constructs such as Fragments, we may need to include special mechanisms for asynchronous invocations, including more types of input parameters. It should also be noted that the paths in CCFAs represent the orders of invocations of callbacks in an app. In the presence of asynchronous invocations, the order of invocations are not always the order of executions; when the system invokes a call asynchronously, the callback is put in the queue rather than directly executed.
COMPUTING A CCFA
In this section, we introduce the algorithms to construct the CCFAs from the source code or binary of an app. The algorithms follow the process presented in Section 2 in Figure 2 and consist of three main procedures that call each other to generate a final CCFA. Specifically, Algorithm 1 represents WTG Analysis in Figure 2 , Algorithm 2 represents Callback Analysis, and Algorithm 3 represents PCS Analysis. Since our algorithms heavily use the WTGs and PCSs representations, we formally introduce them as follows.
A Windows Transition Graph (WTG) specifies the possible GUI window sequences with their corresponding events and handlers [10] . Let W in be the set of all windows (activities, menus or dialogs) defined in an app and C be the set of callbacks implemented in an app. A WTG is a directed graph G = (W in, E, λ, δ, σ) with nodes w ∈ W in and edges e ∈ E ⊆ W in × W in. The initial node in the graph is a LAUNCHER node, and it is connected to the main activity declared in the file AndroidManifest.xml. Edges are labeled with information obtained via functions λ, δ and σ. The function λ : E → Event returns the event that triggered the transition, whereas the function δ : E → (push, pop × W in) * returns the window stack operations. The most relevant to this work is the function
* that returns the sequence of callbacks potentially executed during the transition. A Predicate Callback Summary (PCS) summarizes the control flow of callbacks invoked in the Android API methods [14] . A PCS is a directed graph
where N c is the set of callback nodes, N p is the set of predicate nodes and N u is the set of update nodes that modify the variables used in the predicate nodes. E is the set of edges between any two nodes. The important nodes to our work are the callback nodes. A callback node is specified using a call signature and the object receiver of the callback. Figure 1d presents a simple example of PCS, where the callback onCreateLoader is invoked and the object receiver represents the third parameter of the API call. Shown in Algorithm 1, our analysis takes the window transition graph, WTG, the source or binary code of an app, P , and a set of pre-generated PCSs for Android API methods, Z, as inputs. At a high level, the algorithm uses a worklist to traverse the WTG at lines 3 to 19, obtains all the callbacks in the WTG's edges using the function getNextCallback at line 8, and extends the CCFA at line 11 with the states and transitions constructed from the callbacks.
At lines 1-2, init is the initial state of the CCFA. Seen is the flag that marks whether a node in the WTG has been processed. Each element in Worklist is a pair of node, a node in the WTG currently under processing, and s 0 , the current state in the CCFA under construction to which the new generated transition should connect. Finally, CCFA stores the representation building in progress, specified with 3 elements: init, the initial state as well as a set of transitions and a set of final states (both of them are set to empty sets initially at line 2).
At line 5, the algorithm creates the state s 1 for the WTG node using getState, and at lines 9 and 10, we create the state s 2 . The getState function returns a unique state for each node in the WTG; when invoked with the null parameter, it returns a new state for the next callback in the same edge of the WTG (see line 10). At line 7, the algorithm takes the event from the WTG edge and creates a guard for this transition using createEvtGuard. At line 11, the function Extend takes the CCFA under construction, the states s 0 , s 1 and s 2 , the callback c, and the guard g as inputs, and creates two transitions, one from s 0 to s 1 (see line 21) , and the other from s 1 and s 2 (see line 29). It also analyzes the callback c, resolves any API calls in the callback, and generates a CCFA F c for the callback c (see line 22) . F c takes s 1 as its initial state. The details of analyzeCallback are given in Algorithm 2. At lines 14-16, the target node of this edge, edge.tgt, is added to the worklist if it has not been processed before. At line 18, the exit node of the WTG is encountered, and the last state that has been seen, s 0 , is marked as a final state.
Algorithm 2 presents analyzeCallback, an interprocedural, flow-sensitive analysis on the ICFG of a given callback. At lines 1-2, the algorithm constructs the ICFG for the given callback c and gets the entry node n 0 . It then performs the initializations for the set of data structures Worklist, Seen and F , similar to Algorithm 1.
The worklist algorithm runs from lines 3 to 27. At line 4, n is an ICFG's node, and s 0 is the state last added to F to which we aim to connect. At line 5, n is detected as a call to the API method sendMesssage or post of the Handler class. We get the corresponding callbacks Handler.handMessage or Runnable.run using getCallback, and create the guard g using function createMsgGuard at line 6. Specifically, the function getCallback finds the corresponding callback by getting the type of the object receiver for sendMessage or the first parameter's type for post calls using the pointer analysis. For example, in Figure 3 the transition from state q 8 to q 9 is labeled with MyH .handleMessage entry because the object receiver of the call at line 6 in Figure 3a has the type MyH. Finally, at line 8, the same extend function (see lines [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] in Algorithm 1) is used to add the transitions for the callback c.
In the second case, at line 10, n is detected as an API call site. At line 11 we use the function analyzePCS (details in Algorithm 3) to generate a CCFA for the API call and store it in F P CS . If F P CS is not empty, we add all the transitions of F P CS to the current CCFA F (line 13). We also create epsilon transitions from s 0 to the initial state of F P CS and from the final states of F P CS to a newly created state s 0 at line 15. This new state becomes the last state for this path which is added to the worklist at line 24. To explain this part of the algorithm using an example, in Figure 1b , the F P CS returned for the API call lm.initLoader includes transitions from q 6 to q 8 . The process of concatenating F P CS to the current CCFA adds epsilon transitions from state q 4 to q 6 and from q 8 to q 9 .
At line 21, the current statement is determined to be the exit node of the ICFG, and we thus add s 0 to the final states in the CCFA. At lines 22-25, we continue fetching the successor nodes on the ICFG for further processing. Our current algorithm creates new states every time a callback is added, and in case of the loop, we iterate the loop once to ensure the termination of the analysis. In the future, we plan to integrate an abstraction similar to the approach presented by Shohan et al. [17] In Algorithm 3, we show our approach of generating the CCFA for a given API call stmt. At line 1, we find the PCS for the API call stmt and creates the guard based on its call site. At line 2, we applied pointer analysis to resolve the types of the API call's object receiver and parameters (in our implementation, we used the pointer analysis provided by Soot [18] ). The algorithm uses a worklist to traverse the PCS at lines 6 to 18.
At lines 8-9, we create states s 1 and s 2 for a callback node encountered. At line 10, we set the guard for the current transition: if the previous state s 0 is the initial state init, the guard is g cs ; otherwise the guard is true (only the transitions to the entry point of the first callbacks in the API methods have a guard regarding the API call site). At lines 11-12, we use the function findCallbacks to obtain the possible implementations of callbacks of the current node n. This function first gets the possible types of the callback using ref s and the object receiver of n. For example, if the object receiver in the callback is a parameter of the API call, this function finds all the possible types of the formal parameter at the API call. Then, it finds the callbacks implemented in these types using the callback node's signature. In case the object receiver in the callback node in PCS is unknown, the algorithm conservatively identifies all the callbacks implemented in the app that matches the given callback's 
PROGRAM ANALYSIS USING CCFAS
In this section, we show the two approaches for integrating CCFAs to perform inter-callback analysis. In the first approach, we extend an existing interprocedural, contextsensitive dataflow analysis [19] using CCFAs. The key idea is to query CCFAs for the successor callbacks whenever the analysis reaches the end of a callback or an API call site within the callback. In the second approach, we generate the main function by integrating all the callback sequences provided by CCFAs. This approach is similar to how FLOWDROID [9] integrates the lifecycle model. In both of the approaches, we traverse the paths of the callback invocations provided by the CCFAs without considering the potential impact of the event queue, and the guards regarding external events are treated as true.
First Approach
In Algorithm 4, we present the inter-callback dataflow analysis extended from [19] . The modification is that we add the cases when the analysis reaches the end of a callback and when the analysis reaches an Android API call site. The inputs of the algorithm include ICFGs, the set of ICFGs of the callbacks, L, the semi-lattice of dataflow facts, and x 0 , the initial context. Let N be the set of all nodes in the ICFGs. The output S[N ] reports the dataflow facts for all the nodes in the app.
The main data structures of the algorithm include H and Worklist. H[n, x] reports the current solution at node n ∈ N under context x ∈ L. The worklist contains 5-tuples (n, x, s, c, i), where n ∈ N is a node in the ICFGs, x ∈ L is the current context for the node, s ∈ F.S is a state in the CCFA, c ∈ N is the last API call site we propagated to (c is set to null at the entry node), and i ∈ F.X is the callback from the CCFA under processing. The data structures Worklist and H are initialized at lines 1-4 for all the callbacks labeled in the transitions from the initial state F.s 0 . At lines 6-19, we extend the worklist algorithm from [19] to handle two cases of inter-callback propagation: 1) when the current node n is an API call (see lines 7-13), and 2) when the current node n is the exit node of the callback (see lines [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . At line 30, the algorithm handles the rest of the cases using the original algorithm [19] .
When encountering an API call in the ICFGs, we first identify all the transitions from the current state s that have the guard cs = n or msg = n (at lines 7-9). To preserve the context-sensitivity, at line 8, we save the context and previous call site so that the algorithm can return to the previous call site when exiting from the API call (see line 19) . Then, at line 10, using the input of the transition (t.i), which should be the entry point of a callback, we get n c , the entry node in the ICFG of the callback. Our next step is to compute the dataflow facts at the entry node of the callback using transfer function f c . We use a similar approach taken in the inter-procedural analysis. For example, we resolve this references in the callback based on the object receiver of the callback. At line 11, the propagate function adds (n c , y, t.s 2 , n, t.i) to the worklist if the dataflow facts in y c change the current solution at node n c . The entry node n c will then be processed when the tuple is retrieved from the worklist.
In the second case, n is the exit node of the callback. At line 15, the transfer function f rc updates the dataflow facts at the return of the callback. At lines 16 and 17, we find all the transitions from the exit point of the current callback. If the input of the transition is epsilon (line 18), we reach the end of an API call. At lines 19-20, we propagate the dataflow y r to the successors of the call site c based on the context. In another case, at line 24, the transition indicates the start of the next callback. We first get n c , the entry node of the callback, and then, we compute the updated dataflow facts y c for the entry node using f c .
We instantiated the dataflow analysis to compute the source and sink pairs of a program, where the source is the definition of a new value and sink is where the value is used. To compute sources and sinks of the program, we instantiated Algorithm 4 for a value flow analysis using a similar approach specified in [20] . Our analysis runs two passes in which the first pass propagates the definition of values through the program (using the modification of the algorithm described in [20] ), and the second pass queries the dataflow solution at the node to identify the source statements of each used value.
Second Approach
Here, we create a unique main function that simulates all the callback paths found in the CCFA. The analysis works by traversing the CCFA and using branch conditions when there is more than one path from a CCFA state. When a transition in the CCFA is guarded with an API call, we generate a stub method that includes calls to all the callbacks executed inside the API method. Then, we add an edge to the call graph from the API call to the stub method created. This is a similar approach to the harness methods used in tools such as FLOWDROID. The main difference is that these tools use the lifecycle of components as models to identify the order of callbacks, whereas we generate the harness methods from the CCFAs. The lifecycle of components model provides ordering for callbacks belonging to a component class. For example, they provide the constraint that for an Activity, the callback onCreate is called before onStart. However, this model does not include the callbacks invoked by external events or in API calls made in the app. For instance, the model used for GUI events in FLOWDROID is not as accurate as the GUI model used in WTGs [7] . On the contrary, CCFA integrates callbacks from external events or API calls. Specifically, we obtain a precise ordering of callbacks regarding Windows and GUI events from the WTG and callbacks invoked in API methods from PCSs. It is worth to mention that API methods can invoke lifecycle callbacks. For example, the API method startService invokes lifecycle callbacks onCreate and onStartCommand of Services. All these callbacks are summarized in PCSs and included in the CCFA.
The second difference is that for non-lifecycle callbacks, the current implementation of FLOWDROID creates fresh objects instead of reusing the instances defined in the app. This can create unsoundness issues as pointed out by Blackshear et al. [21] . In our approach, for the most cases, the stub methods created from the CCFA use the actual instances created in the apps as the object receiver for each callback. For example, for the app shown in Figure 1 , our technique creates a stub method for the API method LoaderManager.initLaoder (call at line 12) which uses the third parameter as the object receiver for creating a call to the callback onCreateLoader. Using this approach, interprocedural analyses, such as the taint analysis defined in FLOWDROID, can analyze each callback with the actual dataflow facts of the callback's object receiver.
Finally, the harness methods in tools such as FLOW-DROID use null references for the parameters on the callback calls. In our approach, we use the heuristic of creating unique dummy references for callback calls. This heuristic, while not sound, can help interprocedural analysis to reason about dataflow facts on the parameters of callbacks, which is not allowed on FLOWDROID.
EVALUATION
The goals of our evaluation are to show that 1) the computation of CCFAs is efficient and scalable given a precise call graph, 2) a CCFA can integrate more callbacks in the control flow graphs than the existing solutions, 3) the CCFA is useful for inter-callback analysis of Android apps.
Implementation and Experimental Setup
We implemented our algorithms using Soot [18] and Spark [22] for pointer analysis and call graph construction. To generate the WTG, we extended GATOR [10] and exported WTGs in an XML format which are then loaded and parsed by our tool.
Our study was performed on 135 apps, including 75 real-world apps and 60 benchmarks from DroidBench [23] . The 75 real-world apps include 55 random selected apps from the F-droid repository [24] and 20 apps used in [10] , covering 20 out of 30 categories listed on the Google Play Market. When running the 55 F-droid apps, we found that 35 apps ran successfully and 20 apps failed. Specifically, 12 apps crashed when running either Soot, IC3 or GATOR, and 8 apps ran out of time when analyzed with GATOR (we used a timer of 20 minutes). We believe that obfuscation of the APKs is the main factor affecting the reverse engineering process made by tools such as Soot. Additionally, to measure the precision and recall of our inter-callback taint analysis, we selected 60 apps from 4 categories in DroidBench that focus on inter-callback information leaks (the sink and the source are found in different callbacks).
We collected all the API methods called by the apps in our benchmarks. From the list, we removed API methods that likely contain no callbacks until there are 5000 API methods left. We generated PCSs for the 5000 API methods from the Android framework 4.1, among which 133 PCSs contain at least more than one callback.
All of our experiments were run on a virtual machine (VM) with 4 cores and 40GB of memory. We used a 64-bit JVM with a maximum heap size of 20GB. The VM runs on a machine with 16 cores of Quad-Core AMD Operton 6204.
In the following sections, we first report the performance of building CCFAs (Section 6.2). We then compare the callback coverage of CCFAs versus WTGs (Section 6.3) . Next, we demonstrate the improvement of information flow analysis using CCFAs compared to the existing control flow model, the Lifecycle of the components (Section 6.4). Finally, we report the results of inter-callback value flow analysis using CCFAs (Section 6.5).
Performance
In Table 1 , we report the performance of our tool for computing CCFAs. The first column provides the names of the apps used in our experiments. Under Columns Category, Stmt, CB, WTG, CCFA, we show the category of the app, the number of Jimple statements [25] , the total number of callbacks defined in the app, the number of callbacks covered in the WTG computed for the app, and the number of callbacks covered by the CCFA computed for the app. Column T (s) reports the time (in seconds) used to compute the CCFAs for each app including the time Soot takes to build ICFGs for each callback. As we mentioned in Section 4, for each callback, we apply a context-sensitive, flow-sensitive analysis over its ICFG. If the callback was analyzed before under the same context, we copy the previous CCFA returned for the callback and therefore callbacks under the same context are analyzed just once.
Our results show that on average our tool takes 29 seconds to build the CCFA. The performance of the tool depends on the number of API calls made by the app, and since the analysis is flow-sensitive, the performance also depends on the number of different paths with API calls in the app-we refer to the API calls that at least invoke one callback. For apps k9, MyTracks, and XBMC, the analysis ran out of memory because the number of these paths exploded given that we use a context-insensitive pointer analysis to build the call graph of each callback. This can cause an API call to be visited multiple times from different contexts. For these apps, we restricted the number of callees at each call site.
Overall, for most of the real-world apps, our tool builds CCFAs in less than 15 seconds. For bigger apps such as NewsBlur, chanu and astrid, our tool finishes in less than 700 seconds. To improve the performance and precision of our tool for big apps, we need more precise pointer analysis and call graph construction algorithms.
Callback Coverage
We report the coverage of the callbacks integrated into CCFAs and compared it to WTG-the most advanced callback control flow representation currently available for Android apps. In Table 1 , Column CB reports the total number of callbacks implemented in the app. Under Columns WTG and CCFA, we show the number and the percentage of callbacks integrated into the WTG and CCFA respectively. Our results show that on average, WTG integrates 38.04% of the callbacks for an app; the best case coverage is 78.43% (arXiv) and the worst case is 6.03% (Calculator). CCFA integrates 48.76% of the callbacks on average, an increase of 10.72% over WTG due to the consideration of API calls and integration of PCSs and some external events beyond GUI. The best case is 100% (heregps) which include GUI and GPS external events and the worst case is 8.89% (Munch) is mostly composed by fragments. We leave for future work include these callbacks. We found that apps such as astrid and chanu had 149 and 55 different API calls respectively with at least one callback invoked. On the other hand, in small apps such as arXiv we found 0 API calls that invoked at least one callback. These apps contain mostly GUI callbacks (covered by WTG) and callbacks related to external events that CCFAs do not yet include.
Information Flow Analysis
To determine if the CCFAs are correctly built and can be useful, we applied CCFAs for information flow analysis and value flow analysis. In this section, we show that CCFAs can be used to identify inter-callback information leaks in Android apps. Our approach is to integrate CCFAs with the taint analysis offered by FLOWDROID using the second approach described in Section 5. We compare the results of FLOWDROID using CCFAs as the inter-callback control flow model against the results of FLOWDROID using lifecycle of components (default implementation). To support inter-component leaks using lifecycle of components in FLOWDROID, we use inter-component models generated by IC3 [26] to enable IccTA [27] . Compared with FLOWDROID on real-world apps. In Table 2 , we compared the original FLOWDROID with the lifecycle model (see Column Lifecycle) against FLOWDROID integrated with our CCFAs (see Column CCFA). For the apps that are not on the table, both tools reported 0 leaks or ran out of memory. We manually verified each leak reported by both tools and categorized them as true positive (TP) or false positive (FP). For 49 out of 55 apps, both tools generated the same results. FLOWDROID integrated with CCFAs was able to report 33 more leaks than FLOWDROID. We report 2 more true positives for NotePad, 30 more true positives for NPR, and 1 more for Reservator as a result of the CCFAs. The leaks found in these apps were located in callbacks invoked by API calls. The original FLOWDROID creates their own instances to invoke the callbacks in the API methods, which can be unsound [21] . On the other hand, we used the object receivers obtained from the PCSs, which is safer. We were not able to find the leaks found by FLOWDROID in apps Connectbot and Flym because the source or sink was found in callbacks that are not modeled in CCFAs. Compared with ground truth given by DroidBench. In the second experiment, we selected 60 apps from DroidBench [23] . DroidBench provides a ground truth on where the security leaks are located, based on which we selected the Lifecycle, InterComponentCommunication, Callbacks and AndroidSpecific four categories that contain inter-callback leaks. The experiment aims to further measure the true positives and false positives of our inter-callback analysis, and importantly, also to evaluate the false negative rate.
Our results show that our tool is able to detect intercallback leaks which go across the lifecycle of different components and callbacks related to different classes offered in the Android APIs. The precision and recall of FLOW-DROID with CCFAs on these 4 categories were 96.00% and 84.21% respectively, whereas the precision and recall for For benchmarks related to the lifecycle of components, including the categories Lifecycle and Callbacks, our tool reported a total of 31 true positives, 1 false positive and 2 false negatives. We reported 1 false positive because our tool does not handle correctly the creation of new objects when the activity is destroyed (e.g. when the phone is rotated). The false negatives were found in benchmarks that have Android constructs (e.g. it Fragments) that we do not yet handle. FLOWDROID is able to handle these apps because it adds calls to non-component classes which enables the taint analysis to find the leaks even though the sequence of callbacks might not be correct. FLOWDROID had 3 false negatives in these two categories due to the use of null references for parameters of callback calls. This is the case in which a parameter of a callback is tainted and then it is used to leak information.
For the InterCompCommunication category, we generated 6 false negatives because our tool, which uses IC3 to resolve inter-component calls, was not able to resolve these particular inter-component calls. We found that even state-of-theart tools cannot resolve the complex string operations used to define the component. We also generated 1 false negative related to unregistered listeners which neither GATOR nor our tool handles. FLOWDROID with lifecycle of components had the same false negatives regarding unsolved intents because both tools use IC3 for intent resolving, and 1 false negative because of the use of null references in the callback parameters.
Regarding the AndroidSpecific category, we report 1 false positive, which is related to disabled activities that GATOR does not yet model. Both our tool and FLOWDROID re-ported a false negative in which an external file is tainted with sensitive information and later is read to leak the information. 
Value-Flow Analysis for Source-Sink Pairs
Here, we report our results of value-flow analysis described in Section 5.
Our goal is to demonstrate that the global, i.e., inter-callback and inter-component value flow do exist in the Android apps, and the definitions (source) of the values are sometimes used (sink) in different callbacks and also different components. In Table 4 , under Total, we report the total pairs of sources and sinks found for the app, and under Inter-callback and Inter-comp, we report the pairs where the source and sink are located in different callbacks and different components respectively. We observed that on average, 22.76% of the source-sink pairs were across different callbacks, and the maximum is 62.11% reported by JustCraigslist. We report that 31 out of 55 apps contain inter-component source-sink pairs. We found that in apps such as ContactsList, close to 59% of the inter-callback pairs contain a callback invoked by the API call. This type of global value flows would be missed by tools such as GATOR [10] and also sometimes by FLOWDROID.
For each app, we manually inspected inter-callback source-sink pairs reported (if there are more than 100 pairs, we randomly select 100 pairs). Based on the inspection, we report a false positive rate of 31% on average across all the apps. We found that our tool did not report any false positives for 16 apps. We also found that there are false negatives because we do not yet model all the libraries where the definitions and uses of the app variables can occur. For example, values can flow from different components by storing data in the objects of classes provided by the Android API (e.g. Intent). Current tools used manual summaries (taint wrappers in [9] ) or computed stubs [28] to summarize such dataflow facts.
DISCUSSIONS
The CCFA we generated is neither complete nor precise in that the callback invocation paths we obtain from the CCFA only intersect with the actual callback invocation paths. First, the sources we used to generate CCFAs, including WTGs and PCSs together with 9 external events, are not complete. We need to integrate models for other external events and framework constructs such as Fragments. To integrate external events, we need to understand what callbacks are invoked when the events happen, and where the callbacks of external events are registered: whether they are registered through API calls or in the AndroidManifest file loaded when the app starts. Fragments are a part of GUI systems in the Android apps; to integrate Fragments, we need to model how fragments interact with the activity when they are added or removed. In addition, we need to find all the GUI events that are attached to fragments. We plan to continue investigating how to automatically create a model for fragments in our future work.
Second, when constructing CCFAs, Algorithm 2 traverses the loop once, and therefore, we may miss callback invocation paths if there are multiple paths that contain an API call in the loop. Third, the CCFA is a finite state machine, and our current context guards are not yet able to record the state of the window stack. Compared to WTG, we may add infeasible paths that traverse infeasible context of window transitions. To support stacks, a similar approach like k -CFA call graph construction may be applicable, which we will leave to future work.
There are also limitations for using CCFAs for intercallback analysis. In Algorithm 4, transfer functions f c and f rc update the dataflow facts when the analysis propagates from callers to callees and from callees to callers respectively. These functions only handle the object receivers but not the return values and input parameters of the callbacks. Also, during the analysis of API methods, we may encounter an unknown object receiver for the callbacks (inherit from imprecisions in the PCSs). If the callbacks are not invoked in the API methods, we create a global variable as object receivers instead of using the actual instances created in the app, which is neither precise nor safe. Also, as mentioned before, our inter-callback analysis has not yet modeled the effect of the event-queue for asynchronous calls.
In addition, we have not yet used the guards labeled on the transitions of CCFAs in our client analyses. We foresee that the guards can be used for test input generation and dynamic race detection, where the proper events and messages are needed to be setup for executing a path of interest. The guards can also be used for infeasible path detection on CCFA, which can help static analyses like the information flow and value flow analyses presented in this paper. We plan to implement such improvement in the future work.
RELATED WORK
Static Analysis for Control Flow of Callbacks. Some analyses have focused on soundness and conservatively assume events can happen at any time. TAJS [29] , [30] orders onLoad events but assume any order in the rest of events in Javascript applications. Similarly, Liang et al. [31] compute all permutations between callbacks defined in Android apps. These approaches can be very imprecise since they do not consider any constraint on the ordering of callbacks imposed by the framework (e.g. callback onStart is always executed before callback onResume in activities).
Trying to use knowledge from the semantics of the system, several studies [4] , [5] , [9] , [27] , [32] , [33] have use lifecycle of components in Android apps to define intercallback control flow. However, these approaches just focus on components' callbacks and some GUI events and can be incomplete for the rest of the Android API [7] . Besides control flow constraints offered by lifecycle of components, Blackshear et al. [34] use data dependencies between callbacks to identify more ordering constraints between callbacks.
These approaches offer a limited view of the constraints enforced by the system. As it is shown in [14] , API calls can also have an impact on the control flow of callbacks, and but none of these approaches handle them systematically. Our representation includes control flow constraints on the ordering of callbacks enforced in external events such as GUI events as well as the API calls. Dynamic Analysis for Control Flow of Callbacks. Most of the dynamic analyses on control flow of mobile eventdriven systems focus on race detection problems. Maiya et al. [35] and Hsiao et al. [36] instrument various components of the Android API, including event-queue and memory operations to identify use-after-free race conditions. They define a causality model to reason about the possible ordering of callbacks. Our representation specifies asynchronous callbacks invoked through the event-queue by annotating the call sites and messages, but our intercallback dataflow analysis on the CCFAs does not model the impact of the event queue. We consider that our representation can be used together with the asynchronous semantic rules, similar to the rules defined in [35] , to more accurately analyze asynchronous callbacks. Control Flow Representations for Event-Driven Systems. Our approach of specifying asynchronous callbacks in CCFAs and especially, annotating transitions with the triggering events and API calls is similar to the emit annotation on the event-based call graph [37] , a representation that specifies the scheduling of event listeners in web applications. In addition, Dietrich et al. [38] construct a global control flow graph (GCFG) to handle RTOS semantics, including multiple kernel invocations in embedded systems. For mobile apps, Yang et al. [10] , [39] created a graph representation (WTG) for GUI events and Activities' stack semantics in Android apps. We showed that our representation can integrate all the control flow constraints found in WTGs, as well as the callbacks, invoked in API calls. We thus achieved higher callback coverage.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the definition, construction and applications of a new representation, callback control flow automata (CCFA) for specifying control flow of callbacks in the event-driven, framework-based systems. The representation can express sequential as well as calling relationships between callbacks and can specify both synchronous and asynchronous callback invocations together with the conditions under which these invocations are triggered. We implemented the tool to automatically generate CCFAs from the Android apps' code, and integrated the CCFAs with existing data-flow analysis to support inter-callback analysis. Our experimental results show that the construction of CCFAs is efficient and scalable, we improved the callback coverage over WTGs, and CCFAs improved results in detecting information leaks. Our results also indicate that inter-callback dataflow commonly exists, and callback control flow modeling is important for analyzing and testing such global behaviors. We foresee that CCFAs may be used with tools such as Java Path Finder (JPF) to generate test inputs, and be useful to measure the test coverage of existing tools. As future work, we will explore more applications of CCFAs like detecting sensor leaks [40] , and also consider exploring the applicabilities of CCFAs for other event-driven, framework-based systems such as Node.js [41] .
